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Your Money or Your Life?: Thinking About
the Use of Willingness-to-Pay Studies to
Calculate Hedonic Damages*
Thief: Your money or your life?
Jack Benny- (Pause) I'm thinking! I'm thinking!
L Introduction
Legal commentators frequently debate the propriety of awarding
damages for nonpecumary losses,2 often called losses for pain and
suffering,3 m tort actions.' Some legal commentators propose abolishing,
at least m some situations, awards for nonpecumary losses altogether.5
* The author would like to express his appreciation to Professor James M. Phemister
and Tanya Dobash for their assistance m the development of this Note.
1. See Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 871 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Jack Benny's
comedy bit when considering admission of testimony of hedome damages expert).
2. See John E. Calfee & Paul H. Rubin, Some Implications of Damage Payments for
Nonpecunary Losses, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 371 (1992) (defining harms other than loss
of wealth as nonpecumary losses).
3. See John E. Calfee & Clifford Winston, The Consumer Welfare Effects of Liability
for Pain and Suffering: An Exploratory Analysis, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTnITY: MCROECONOMICS 1 at 133, 133 (Martin N. Baily et al. eds., 1993) (observing
that commentators treat compensation for nonpecumary losses and pamn and suffering
damages as synonymous terms); W Kip Viscusi, Comments and Discussion, in BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTvrry: MICROECONOMICS 1, supra, at 175, 175 (describing "pain
and suffering" as shorthand that commentators use to summarize all components of
nonpecuniary compensation that accident victims receive, including loss of consortium and
companionship, mental anguish, grief, and loss of enjoyment of life).
4. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUiTY-RESTITUTION
§ 8.1(4), at 397 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that number of critics have expressed disapproval of
pain and suffering awards that courts now make); W Kip VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS
LABmLTY 114 (1991) (noting dissatisfaction with manner in which courts calculate damages
for pain and suffering).
5. See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 408-11 (1988) (arguing that courts should not impose strict
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Other commentators propose expanding the contexts in which courts permit
such awards.6 Still others propose that state legislatures place caps on
awards for nonpecumary losses' or develop compensation schedules that
courts or juries can apply to the facts of particular cases.' Legal commen-
tators present such proposals because they perceive that jury awards for
pain and suffering lack consistency9 and provide an inefficient means of
compensating victims for nonpecumary losses.10
Despite the vigorous debate by legal commentators, courts tradition-
ally have upheld the vast majority of pain and suffering awards with little
comment.11 Recently, however, courts also have begun to debate the extent
to which victims should receive compensation for nonpecumary losses.12
Largely responsible for this debate is a small group of economists who
liability for nonpecumary losses).
6. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 186-89 (1987) (criticizing wrongful death statutes that do not allow courts to
award damages for decedents' nonpecunmary losses).
7 See Marcus L. Plant, Damages for Pam and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200, 211
(1958) (proposing that courts limit pain and suffering awards to 50% of medical, nursing,
and hospital expenses proved at trial); see also 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 8.8, at 523-30
(discussing tort reformers' efforts to place statutory caps on damage awards).
8. See ViscusI, supra note 4, at 115-16 (recommending that courts assist juries in
awarding damages for pain and suffering by providing advisory schedules); Randall R.
Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering, " 83 Nw.
U. L. REv 908, 975 (,1989) (suggesting that courts replace present system of awards for
nonpecumary losses with quantitative scheduling).
9 See, e.g., VIsCUSI, supra note 4, at 114 (noting clais of inconsistency in jury
awards for pam and suffering); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8, at 908 (calling noneconomic
damage awards unpredictable); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 411 (stating that businesses find
nonpecumary damages difficult to predict and insure against); Stan V Smith, Hedonic
Damages in the Courtroom Setting-A Bridge Over Troubled Waters, 3 J. FORENSIC ECON.
41, 48 (1990) (observing that courts traditionally have left jurors to make unpredictable
estimations of nonpecunmary damages).
10. Cf Schwartz, supra note 5, at 408 (arguing that strict liability for nonpecumary
harm requires consumers to purchase more insurance and safety than they want).
11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 197 (4th ed. 1992) (noting
that courts largely have ignored vexing problem of proper valuation of life); Irene Deaville
Sann, Remittiturs (and Additurs) in the Federal Courts: An Evaluation with Suggested
Alternatives, 38 CASE W RES. L. REv 157, 186-87 (1987) (observing that most courts deny
motions for remittitur unless jury verdict shocks court's conscience).
12. See Michael L. Brookshire & James C. Peterson, Loss of Enjoyment of Life
Damages, TRIAL, June 1992, at 60, 60 (calling admissibility of lost-enjoyment-of-life
evidence issue in almost every jurisdiction).
HEDONIC DAMAGES
assert that they have developed a revolutionary method of calculating
nonpecumary damages."3 These economists base their calculations of
"hedomc damages"14 on willingness-to-pay (WTP) studies."5  WTP studies
measure how much individuals will pay to reduce or will accept to increase
their risks of death or injury 16 Many government policymakers already use
data from WTP studies as the basis for evaluating the relative benefits of
regulations that save lives. 7 Hedonic damages experts assert that courts
should use tus same data to calculate nonpecumary damages.'" These
13. See MICHAEL L. BROOKSHIRE & STAN V SMITH, ECONOMIC/HEDONIC DAMAGES:
THE PRACTICE BOOK FOR PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 162 (1990 & .Supp. 1992)
(asserting that only small percentage of economists has expertise in new method of
calculating nonpecuniary damages); Ted R. Miller, Willingness To Pay Comes of Age: Will
the System Survive?, 83 Nw. U. L. REv 876, 906 (1989) (describing new method of
calculating nonpecumary damages as quantum leap beyond current approaches).
14. See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 164 (defining hedonic damages as
value of pleasure, satisfaction, or utility that human beings derive from life, separate and
apart from labor or earnings value of life); cf. John R. Glenme, Hedonic Damages:
Economists Can Assist With Proof, NAT'L L.J, Sept. 5, 1988, at 15, 15 (stating that hedonic
value of life encompasses all satisfactions and joys life may bring, including satisfaction
from personal achievement, being in love, and enjoying company of friends). The term
"hedonic damages," as used m this Note, refers to calculations of the value of nonpecumary
damages in tort actions using data from willingness-to-pay (WTP) studies.
15, See generally BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 161-75 (1990) & 57-67
(Supp. 1992) (discussing use of WTP data to calculate hedonic damages); Miller, supra note
13, at 891-907 (discussing use of WTP data in courts).
16. See Ann Fisher et al., The Value of Reducing Risks of Death: A Note on New
Evidence, 8 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 88, 89 (1989) (stating that WTP estimate
measures how much of other goods and services people will give up to gain reduction in risk
of death).
17 See id. at 98 (explaining that WTP studies can assist government policymakers in
allocating resources among various programs that extend human lives, and between
programs that save human lives and those that accomplish other societal goals); Miller,
supra note 13, at 886-91 (discussing use of risk reduction values in regulatory analysis); see
also Peter Passell, Disputed New Role for Polls: Putting a Price Tag on Nature, N.Y
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at Al (noting that Congress and courts have ordered federal
regulators to use WTP measurements to value animals' lives).
18. See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 161 (explaining that economic experts
can assist courts in calculating intangible damages). Some economists also recommend
using data from WTP studies to evaluate the efficacy of awarding punitive damages in
product liability actions. Id. at 173; W Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Has Voodoo
Economics Come to the Courts?, 3 J. FORENSIC ECON. 1, 15 (1990). According to hedomc
damages experts Michael L. Brookshire and Stan V Smith, courts should levy punitive
damages against manufacturers that exhibit considerable disregard for life's value.
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experts argue that hedome damages calculations will add a measure of
certainty previously unknown to nonpecumary awards, 9 will guarantee
victims of tortious conduct adequate compensation," and will increase
judicial efficiency 21
According to one economist, however, pam and suffering awards will
consume ten to fifteen percent of this nation's gross national product per
year if courts adopt hedomc damages calculations as the umversal standard
for nonpecumary awards.' According to another economist, admission of
hedonic damages testimony will lead to a tenfold increase in tort awards?23
Even if these economists exaggerate the effect of hedomc damage awards,
it is clear that such awards could have a significant impact on tort
recoveries. Therefore, courts must evaluate carefully the propriety of such
awards, as well as the scientific support for both the WTP approach and
hedonic damages experts' further extrapolations of nonpecumary losses
from WTP data.24
This Note discusses some of the complex legal and scientific questions
surrounding the debate over admission of expert testimony in the area of
hedomc damages. Part II illumnnates how economists calculate hedomc
damages. Part II.A examines how those who conduct WTP studies go
about placing a value on human life. Part II.B reveals how economists
derive a value for victims' nonpecumary damages from WTP data. Part III
addresses the relevance of hedomc damages calculations to pam and
suffering awards. Part I.A discusses the dual goals of the tort sys-
BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 173. A manufacturer who spends only $10,000
to save one statistical life, when WTP studies indicate that society would pay much more,
for example, should pay punitive damages.
19. See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 167 (asserting that expert testimony
about way that economists measure life's value removes assessment process from speculative
realm).
20. See id. at 165 (asserting that expert testimony will lead to fair awards).
21. Id.
22. Thomas Havrilesky, Valuing Life in the Courts: An Overview, 3 J. FORENSIC
ECON. 71, 71 (1990).
23. Viscusi, supra note 18, at 1, cf. Jack E. Karns, Economics, Ethics, and Tort
Remedies: The Emerging Concept of Hedonic Value, 9 J. Bus. ETHICs 707, 708 (1990)
(observing that some hedonic damage awards triple or quadruple amount of awards for lost
earnings).
24. See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 168 (describing WTP literature as
highly technical); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786,
2795 (1993) (concluding that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires courts to evaluate
relevance and reliability of scientific testimony or evidence before permitting admission).
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tern-compensation and deterrence-and Part HLI.B explains that hedonic
damages calculations represent deterrence values, not compensation values.
Part III.C analyzes the contexts in which hedonic damage awards and
testimony by experts may be relevant. Part II.D addresses whether the
testimony of hedonic damages experts actually assists jurors in calculating
nonpecumary damages. Part IV explores critics' concerns about the
reliability of WTP studies and experts' calculations of nonpecumary
damages based on WTP data. Part IV.A analyzes criticisms of the types
of risks that WTP studies measure, of the risk assessment data upon which
WTP studies rely, and of discrepancies in value-of-life estimates and then
looks at one court's criticisms of WTP studies and explains the flaws in
those criticisms. Part V.B considers criticisms of the ways in which
experts convert WTP data to estimates of hedonic damages. This Note
concludes that courts only rarely should permit nonpecumary awards based
on the calculations of hedonic damages experts because such calculations
are irrelevant to most tort contexts. In those few contexts in which such
awards may be appropriate, however, courts should not hastily dismiss
WTP studies or hedonic damages calculations as "junk science."
I. Calculation of Hedonic Damages
Calculating hedonic damages involves a two-step process. First,
hedonic damages experts, relying on WTP studies, place a value on the
average human life.' Second, hedonic damages experts deduct pecuniary
losses from that value to arrive at what they claim is the victim's nonpecu-
mary damages.6
A. Placing a Value on Human Life
Hedomc damages experts begin their calculations by placing a value
on the life of a statistically average person (statistical life)Y Although
hedonc damages experts may gather information for their calculations from
25. See mfra part I.A (discussing how economists who conduct WTP studies measure
life's value).
26. See infra part II.B (discussing how experts calculate nonpecumary losses).
27 See BROOKSH-RE & SMiTH, supra note 13, at 168 (indicating that hedonic damages
expert begins by estimating life's total value); Daniel McGowan & Sharon O'Hanlon, An
Attorney's Primer on Hedonic Damages, 26 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 1, 7 (1993) (indicating that
hedonic value represents residual value derived from anonymous individual's after-tax
value).
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many sources,28 they principally rely on data from WTP studies. 29
Economists who conduct WTP studies use a relatively simple mathematical
formula to calculate the value of a statistical life:
Payment to Reduce Reduction in Value of
Probability of Dying Probability of Dying Life"°
Assume, for example, that Boris and five of his friends will pay an
average of $100,000 to avoid playing one round of Russian roulette, a
game m which each faces a risk of death of one in six. Economists would
conclude that Boris and his friends place a value of $600,000 on a
statistical life, $100,000 for each person's one-sixth chance of dying.31
Economists who conduct WTP studies traditionally gather three types
of information: information from the labor market, information about
consumers' purchasing habits, and information from survey hypotheti-
cals.32 Wage-risk analyses, wich make up the majority of WTP studies,33
28. See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 166-70 (identifying three possible
approaches hedonic damages experts can use to value life: estimates based on WTP
studies, estimates based on individuals' willingness to pay for their own lives, and
estimates based on society's willingness to pay for specific lives). Hedonic damages expert
Stan V Smith testified in one case that the federal government's expenditure for pilot
ejection seats indicated that the government valued pilots' lives at $9.8 million each.
Jerome M. Staller, Damages: Placing a Value on the Enjoyment of Life, FOR DEF., June
1989, at 8, 9. Brookshire and Smith also recommend presenting juries with information
about the cost that society incurs to keep prisoners incarcerated. BRoOKsHIRE & SMITH,
supra note 13, at 170.
29. See BROOKSHiRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 59 (Supp. 1992) (indicating clear
consensus that WTP model must serve as benchmark for value-of-life estimates in hedonic
analyses). Some economists base their measures of the value of individuals' lives on the
amount of their economic output. Miller, supra note 13, at 876-77 Economists who use
the WTP model criticize this method, known in the economics literature as the human
capital approach, for ignoring nonmonetary values such as quality of life and for
undervaluing the services of homemakers, senior citizens, and others. Id. at 877-78.
30. See McGowan & O'Hanlon, supra note 27, at 3 (explaining WTP methodology-
monetary value of life X reduction in probability of dying = payment to reduce
probability of dying).
31. $100,000 - 1/6 = $600,000.
32. See Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 89 (grouping WTP studies into three
categories: wage-risk studies, contingent market studies, and consumer market studies).
33. See BRooKsHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 59 (Supp. 1992) (noting that more
wage-risk studies exist than any other category of WTP studies).
HEDONIC DAMAGES
review information about how much more workers earn for increased risks
of death and injury " If the average coal miner earns an additional $500
for every one-ten-thousandth increase in the risk of death, for example,
economists who conduct wage-risk analyses conclude that average coal
miners value their lives at $5 million.35 Wage-risk analyses differ from
other types of WTP studies because they focus on what average individu-
als will accept to increase, not pay to decrease, their risks of death or
injury 36
Consumer market analyses review information about the amount
consumers pay for products that affect their health and safety " In her
study of the fire detector market,3" for example, economist Rachel Dardis
observed that consumers paid an annualized cost of $9 75 in 1976 dollars
for smoke detectors.39 Dardis also observed that purchasing a smoke
detector reduced one's risk of dying by about one in 31,600 in any given
year."° Based on these findings, Dardis concluded that consumers valued
34. See Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 89 (stating that wage-risk studies estimate wage
premium associated with greater risks of death on job); Ted R. Miller, The Plausible Range
for the Value of Life-Red Herrings Among the Mackerel, 3 J. FORENSIC ECON. 17, 17
(1990) (stating that wage-risk studies analyze compensating wage differentials associated
with risky jobs).
35. 500 - 1/10,000 = $5,000,000; see Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 89 (using
hypothetical to explain how economists derive value for statistical life from wage-risk
information). In their review of the WTP literature, Fisher et al. presented the preceding
hypothetical merely to explain how wage-risk analyses work. Id. Fisher et al. do not
appear to have based this hypothetical on an actual WTP study
36. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text (addressing contexts in which
economists deem distinction between willingness to pay money to prevent risk and
willingness to accept money to avoid exposure to risk important).
37 See Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 95 (stating that consumer market studies
examine observable tradeoffs that people make between risks and benefits in consumption
decisions); Miller, supra note 34, at 17 (stating that market studies analyze market for
products that affect health and safety).
38. Rachel Dardis, The Value of a Life: New Evidence from the Marketplace, 70 AM.
ECON. REv 1077 (1980); cf. Miller, supra note 34, at 25, 28 (explaining Miller's
"improved version" of Dardis's model). Qf. generally Christopher Garbacz, Smoke Detector
Effectiveness and the Value of Saving a Lie, 31 ECON. LErrERS 281 (1989) (reporting on
Garbacz's consumer market analysis of smoke detector market).
39. Dardis, supra note 38, at 1080. Dardis calculated the present value of the amount
individuals paid for smoke detectors for the years 1974 through 1979 by using both a 5%
and 10% discount rate. Id.
40. Id. at 1079. Dardis also considered the amount that individuals were willing to
pay to avoid injury Id. at 1078-79. This example, however, ignores the possibility that
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a statistical life at approximately $308,000 in 1976 dollars.4' Consumer
market analyses, like wage-risk analyses, measure actual behavior.42
Contingent valuation surveys, by contrast, present respondents with
hypothetical situations and then ask them to make choices that will affect
their health and safety I3 A surveyor nught ask drivers to estimate the
amount of money they would pay for an automobile with a safety package
that cuts in half a driver's chances of dying in a fatal accident.'
Economists traditionally conduct contingent valuation surveys only when
market information does not exist' because economists find it difficult to
design surveys that produce reliable responses.'
B. Denving a Value for Nonpecumary Losses
WTP studies produce a wide range of estimates, from as low as $0
to as high as $15 million and beyond, for the value of a statistical life. 7
Thus, the value that a hedonic damages expert selects has a significant
impact on the outcome of that expert's calculations.48 Reviews of the
WTP literature provide the best source for consensus statistical life values
individuals might also buy smoke detectors to reduce their risks of injury.
41. Id. at 1080.
42. Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 95.
43. See td. at 94 (stating that contingent valuation approach poses hypothetical market
situation to survey respondents, who then must respond about their willingness to pay for
alternative levels of safety).
44. See Calfee & Winston, supra note 3, at 141 (using survey hypothetical similar to
hypothetical in lext).
45. See W Kip ViscusI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR RISK 68 (1992) (suggesting that economists limit surveys to situations for which no good
market information exists); Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 94 (asserting that economists can
tailor surveys to address policy questions for which market information does not exist).
46. See ViscUsi, supra note 45, at 67-68 (expressing concern that survey respondents
neither give honest and thoughtful responses nor process probability information accurately);
Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 94 (identifying fact that surveys measure what people say,
not what they do, as principal drawback). Compare Calfee & Winston, supra note 3, at
142-43 n.17 (identifying criticisms of contingent valuation surveys, but asserting that most
criticisms do not apply to& Calfee and Winston survey) with Viscusi, supra note 3, at 182-91
(discussing problems with Calfee and Winston survey).
47 See Miller, supra note 34, at 17 (stating that WTP studies yield statistical life
values ranging from $0 to $15 million in 1988 dollars).
48. See infra note 75 and accompanying text (setting out mathematical formula that




because reviewers attempt to reconcile data from different WTP studies.4 9
Wage-risk analyses, for example, traditionally rely on data bases that
measure before-tax income, while consumer market analyses consider how
individuals spend their after-tax income.50 Economists who conduct WTP
studies also often express their values in terms of different base-year
amounts.5' Reviews of the WTP literature consider and adjust for these
and other factors before arriving at what the reviews describe as consensus
value-of-life estimates.52
Government policy analysts Ann Fisher, Laurame G. Chestnut, and
Daniel M. Violette (1989)' 3 and economists Ted R. Miller (1990) 51 and
W Kip Viscusi (1992) 55 have reviewed the WTP literature recently 56
Fisher, Chestnut, and Violette conclude that the value of a statistical life
falls somewhere between $1.6 million and $8.5 million in 1986 dollars.
Miller places the value at $2.2 million plus or minus thirty percent in 1988
dollars.58 Viscusi believes that reasonable estimates cluster in the
$3 million to $7 million range in December 1990 dollars.59 Many hedonic
damages experts currently use Miller's $2.2 million estimate, adjusted to
present value, as the starting point for their calculations. 6'
49. Cf. BROOKSHIRE &SMrrIH, supra note 13, at 168 (expressing opinion that no single
study provides perfect answer to value of statistical life).
50. Miller, supra note 34, at 19.
51. See Vtscusi, supra note 45, at 52-54, 61-63, 66 (adjusting data from WTP studies
to December 1990 dollars); Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 90 (adjusting data from WTP
studies to 1986 dollars); Miller, supra note 34, at 26-27, 31, 38-39 (adjusting data from
WTP studies to 1988 dollars).
52. See generally Viscusi, supra note 45 (surveying WTP literature); Fisher et al.,
supra note 16 (same); Miller, supra note 34 (same).
53. Fisher et al., supra note 16.
54. Miller, supra note 34.
ViscusI, supra note 45, at 34-74.
56. Cf. M.W JONES-LEE, TIE EcONOMICS OF SAFETY AND PHYSICAL RISK 36-101
(1989) (reviewing both British and American WTP studies and concluding that value of
statistical life is not less than £500,000 and may exceed £1,000,000).
57 Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 96.
58. Miller, supra note 34, at 32.
59. VISCUSI, supra note 45, at 73.
60. See Fetzer v Wood, 569 N.E.2d 1237, 1246 (Il. App. Ct. 1991) (noting that
hedonic damages expert proposed to testify about statistically anonymous life by using value
similar to estimate in Miller's review); Laing v American Honda Motor Co., 628 So. 2d
196, 203-04 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (same); Wilt v Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 204 (W Va.
1527
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The WTP literature contains little about the effect of personal charac-
teristics like age, income, or personal habits on the values that different in-
dividuals place on reducing risks of death and injury 61 As a result, hedome
damages experts do not adjust value-of-life estimates to reflect any of a vic-
tim's personal characteristics except age.62 Yet, even when addressing age,
hedomc damages experts adjust their calculations only to reflect the remain-
ing life expectancy of the average individual of the victim's age because
experts presume that individuals' valuations do not change as individuals
grow older.63 Even so, some hedonic damages experts will assert at trial
that personal characteristics unique to a particular victim indicate that the
particular victim values life more or less than the average person does. 61
Individuals who own smoke detectors,' do not work as bartenders,' and
1993) (describing Miller's review, but not identifying it by name, while discussing testimony
of hedomc damages expert), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2137 (1994); see also BROOKSHIRE &
SMrrH, supra note 13, at 58 (Supp. 1992) (citing Miller's review of WTP research as most
current). But see Livingston v United States, 817 F Supp. 601, 605 (E.D.N.C. 1993)
(noting that hedonic damages expert Gary Albrecht sought to rely on review of WTP
literature by Daniel M. Violette and Lauraine G. Chestnut).
61. See BROOKSHIE& SMITH, supra note 13, at 168 (indicating that economists who
conduct WTP studies find taking into account individual characteristics beyond age, race,
and sex difficult); Miller, supra note 13, at 895 (noting that economic literature has rarely
discussed tailoring value-of-life estimates to fit demographic characteristics); see also
VISCUSI, supra note 45, at 28-31 (discussing effects of income and age on value-of-life
estimates).
62. See BRooKsHmE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 168 (explaining that hedonic damages
experts adjust calculations to reflect life expectancy); McGowan & O'Hanlon, supra note
27, at 9 (observing that hedonic damages experts begin calculations by determining "anony-
mous" life's total value).
63. See McGowan & O'Hanlon, supra note 27, at 10 (assuming unchanging real value
of anonymous life over mdividual's life expectancy as necessary predicate to calculation of
hedonic damages). No one appears to have tested in a WTP study the hypothesis that
individuals' life valuations remain the same as they grow older.
64. See Miller, supra note 13, at 899-900 (explaining that individual's behavior may
serve as basis for individualizing value-of-life estimates). Miller warns, though, that
defendants may attack an expert's attempts to individualize value-of-life estimates because
individuals behave inconsistently Id. at 899.
65. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing Dardis's study of fire
detector market). Hedonic damages experts might argue that plaintiffs that do not own
smoke detectors value their lives at $308,000 or more in 1976 dollars. See generally
Dardis, supra note 38 (reporting results of Dardis's study of fire detector market).
66. See Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 91 (observing that actuarial risk information
reveals that bartenders face higher risks of death than policemen and firemen). Fisher
explains this seeming anomaly by pointing to the personal characteristics of individuals who
1528
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do not smoke cigarettes, 67 for instance, arguably value reducing their risks
of death and injury more than those exhibiting the opposite characteristics
do.
When economist Stan Smith first introduced the concept of hedonic
damages to Illinois courts m the mid-1980s,6" Smith argued incorrectly that
WTP studies measure the value of the average human life "separate from
[the] economic productive value of an individual."69 Not surprisingly,
Smith, when calculating hedonic damages in those early cases, did not
deduct economic values such as earnings, fringe benefits, and household
services from value-of-life estimates.7' Almost all experts, including Smith,
now agree that WTP studies measure the total value society places on life,
including pecuniary values. 7'
Therefore, most hedonic damages experts today deduct the present
value of damages for the victim's lost future earnings, fringe benefits, and
household services from statistical life values to prevent what they
characterize as double recoveries for these items.' Experts also deduct the
value for preserving financial security73 because damage awards, at least in
theory, restore any financial security that the tortious conduct takes from
work as bartenders. Id.
67 See Miller, supra note 13, at 899 (stating that expert witness might argue that
person who quits smoking places value of at least $700,000 on life). Miller notes in an
accompanying footnote that the value that he gives represents a purely hypothetical example.
Id. at 899 n.121. See generally Pauline M. Ippolito & Richard A. Ippolito, Measuring the
Value of Life Saving from Consumer Reactions to New Information, 25 J. PUB. ECON. 53
(1984) (analyzing effect of health hazard information on cigarette smoking).
68. See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 162 (stating that Smith first
introduced expert testimony on hedonic damages in 1985 Illinois case).
69. Sherrod v Berry, 629 F Supp. 159, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd and remanded
on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988).
70. See Miller, supra note 13, at 893-94 n.95 (noting that Smith in Sherrod incorrectly
failed to subtract lost earnings from value-of-life estimate).
71. See d. (stating that Smith now subtracts lost earnings from value-of-life estimates,
but that other "experts" have failed to correct Smith's error); see also Smith, supra note 9,
at 43 (indicating that economists must subtract lost earnings, household services, and
financial security, from value-of-life estimates to arrive at hedomc value).
72. See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 168 (discussing method for
calculating lost enjoyment of life from value-of-life estimates); McGowan & O'Hanlon,
supra note 27, at 7-10 (same).
73. BROOKSHIRE & SMrrH, supra note 13, at 168; see McGowan & O'Hanlon, supra
note 27, at 8 (noting that hedome damages experts subtract present value of satisfaction of
knowing that plaintiffs will have income available in future from value-of-life estimates).
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- Future Fringe Benefits
- Future Household Services
- Financial Securit
Hedonic Damages7s
Experts assert that courts should award this residual value, which experts
call "hedomc damages," for a victim's nonpecumary damages. 76
Although some WTP studies measure how much average individuals
will pay to reduce their risks of injury,77 hedonic damages experts generally
do not rely on this data for their calculations in personal injury cases. 78
Instead, mental health professionals assist experts by assessing the loss that
a particular plaintiff has suffered.79 Mental health professionals evaluate the
74. See Miller, supra note 13, at 893-94 (stating that individuals compensated for
economic losses do not lose sense of financial security).
75. See BROOKSHRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 168 (setting out equation that experts
use to calculate hedonic damages); McGowan & O'Hanlon, supra note 27, at 9 (same). A
hedonic damages expert starting with a statistical life value of $8.5 million (the high end of
Fisher, Chestnut, and Violette's range) will arrive at an estimate for hedonic damages $6.9
million larger than an expert starting with a value of $1.6 million (the low end of Fisher,
Chestnut, and Violette's range), all other values being equal. Fisher et al., supra note 16,
at 96.
76. See BROOKSHRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 168 (explaining that residual hedonic
value can assist jurors in determining appropriate damage award for intangible losses).
77 See VISCUSI, supra note 45, at 59-65, 70-73 (reviewing WTP studies that measure
value that individuals place on preventing injury).
78. See Mercado v Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining how
economist arrved at value for hedonic damages in personal injury action); Wilt v Buracker,
443 S.E.2d 196, 204-05 (W Va. 1993) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2137 (1994); see
also BROOKSHIRE &SMrrH, supra note 13, at 172-73 (1990) & 64 (Supp. 1992) (discussing
hedonic damages calculations in personal injury actions); Miller, supra note 13, at 896-99
(discussing approaches that experts could take to calculate hedonic damages m personal
injury actions). See generally Edward P Berla et al., Hedonic Damages and Personal
Injury: A Conceptual Approach, 3 J. FORENsIc ECON. 1 (1990) (explaining method for
calculating hedonic damages in personal injury actions); Wolfgang W Franz, Calculating
Hedonic Damages in Personal Injury Cases, WASH. ST. BAR NEWS, March 1993, at 20
(discussing hedonic damages calculations in personal injury actions).
79 See Mercado, 974 F.2d at 869 (noting that hedonic damages expert relied on
information that neuropsychologist provided in considering degree of plaintiff's loss); see
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plaintiff's loss of practical functioning," emotional functioning, sl social
functioning,' and occupational functioning' and then estimate m percentage
terms the dimnution in the plaintiff's quality of life.A According to one
scale, a person who suffers significant scarring as a result of burns suffered
in a fire generally will experience a fifty percent to sixty-seven percent loss
in functioning, while a person who misses a few days of work after an
automobile accident will suffer only a one percent to seventeen percent
loss."s  Hedomc damages experts simply multiply the value of hedomc
damages had the plaintiff died by the percentage of loss that the mental
health professional provides.8 6
Il. Relevance of Hedonic Damages Calculations
Courts have been reluctant to recognize the hedomc damages approach
as a legitimate method of valuing nonpecuniary losses." Even so, many
also BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 64 (Supp. 1992) (recommending interdisci-
plinary process, involving economists and psychologists, for calculating hedonic damages
in personal injury actions); Berla et al., supra note 78, at 1 (same).
80. See Berla et al., supra note 78, at 2 (explaining that practical functioning refers
to extent of effect on person's activity in daily living, including reading, grooming, dressing,
eating, sleeping, shopping, traveling, doing housework, and parenting).
81. See id. (explaining that emotional/psychological functioning refers to person's
ability to live on daily basis free of any debilitating emotional problems that diminish
capacity to enjoy life and compromise person's sense of self-worth, dignity, and integrity).
82. See id. (explaining that social functioning refers to person's capacity to derive
pleasure from interacting with other people, including family interactions, athletic activities,
social events, hobbies, and any other interpersonal interactions).
83. See id. (explaining that occupational functioning refers to person's ability to
engage in career or vocation of choice and to derive pleasure from occupational identity
independent of any monetary compensation).
84. See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 64 (Supp. 1992) (noting that
psychologists usually provide conclusions on degree of lost enjoyment of life m percentage
terms).
85. See Berla et al., supra note 78, at 2-4 (explaining lost-pleasure-of-life scale for use
in personal injury actions). The degree of an individual's loss may vary over time. Id. at
4.
86. See id. at 6-7 (illustrating calculation process that hedonic damages experts use in
personal injury cases).
87 See, e.g., Trabucco v Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 93-3090, 1994 WL 419846, at
*1 (E.D. La. Aug. 5, 1994) (granting defendant's motion in limme to exclude testimony of
hedonic damages expert); Livingston v United States, 817 F Supp. 601, 606 (E.D.N.C.
1993) (concluding that testimony of hedonic damages expert failed to pass muster under
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courts speak less than articulately when explaining this reluctance because
they misunderstand the rationale behind hedomc damages testimony 88
Many courts mistakenly believe that hedonic damage awards seek to make
victims whole." Instead, hedonic damage awards make tortfeasors pay
victims amounts equivalent to that which society (average individuals)
Federal Rules of Evidence); Johnson v. Inland Steel Co., No. 87-C-5541, 1992 WL 396296,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 1992) (granting defendant's motion to bar expert from discussing
hedonic damages); Bramlette v Hyundai Motor Co., No. 91-C-3635, 1992 WL 213956, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 1992) (granting defendants' motion to bar evidence of hedonic
damages); Craft v Matlack, Inc., No. 91-2465, 1992 WL 124406, at *1 (E.D. La. May 26,
1992) (refusing to allow expert to present hedonic damages testimony); Buckhalter v
Burlington N. R.R., No. EC90-139-D-D, 1992 WL 236676, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 23,
1992) (excluding testimony of hedonic damages expert); Augustin v Hyatt Regency, No.
91-0670, 1992 WL 21823, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 1992) (granting defendants' motion to
prohibit testimony of economist on value of loss of enjoyment of life); Mercado v Ahmed,
756 F Supp. 1097, 1103 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (granting defendants' motion to bar testimony of
hedonic damages expert), aff'd, 974 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1992), Fetzer v Wood, 569 N.E.2d
1237, 1247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (affirming trial court's exclusion of testimony of hedonic
damages expert); Southlake Limousine & Coach, Inc. v Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 682 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that trial court erred in admitting testimony of hedonic damages
expert); Longman v Allstate Ins. Co., 635 So. 2d 343, 354-55 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (finding
that trial court did not abuse discretion when it excluded testimony of hedonic damages
expert); Foster v Trafalgar House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284, 286 (La. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that trial court erred by not granting defendants' motion in limme to exclude
testimony of hedonic damages expert); Wilt v Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203-04 (W Va.
1993) (concluding that trial court erred in admitting testimony of hedonic damages expert),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2137 (1994); Liston v University of W Va. Bd. of Trustees, 438
S.E.2d 590, 595 (W Va. 1993) (same). But see Wanke v Lynn's Transp. Co., 836 F
Supp. 587, 591 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (deferring ruling on defendants' motion in limme to
exclude testimony of hedonic damages expert, but indicating that expert likely would not
satisfy admissibility standards); Moore v Kroger Co., 800 F Supp. 429, 436 (N.D. Miss.
1992) (refusing to limit testimony of hedonic damages expert until court could more fully
explore substance of testimony at trial), aff'd, 18 F.3d 936 (5th Cir. 1994); Sherrod v
Berry, 629 F Supp. 159, 164 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that court did not err in admitting
testimony of hedonic damages expert), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802
(7th Cir. 1988); Laing v American Honda Motor Co., 628 So. 2d 196, 204 (La. Ct. App.
1993) (finding sufficient support for $1.35 million jury award for plaintiff's loss of
enjoyment of life and mental anguish, even if trial court erroneously permitted hedonic
damages expert's testimony).
88. See Tina M. Tabacchl, Note, Hedomc Damages: A New Trend in Compensation?,
52 OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 348 (1991) (concluding that hedonic damages calculations have
confused courts).
89 See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (explaining why no amount of
compensation can make most victims of nonpecuniary losses whole).
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would pay to prevent the harms in the first place.' More than semantics
distinguishes these two rationales, at least in the context of nonpecumary
losses.
A. The Goals of Compensation and Deterrence
Tort damage awards ideally fulfill two goals-compensation and
deterrence." Tort awards compensate when they restore victims to their
former positions.' Tort awards deter potential tortfeasors when they
provide potential tortfeasors with an incentive to behave in ways that
society considers optimal.93
Tort awards for property losses generally fulfill the goals of
compensation and deterrence simultaneously I Assume, for example, that
a tortfeasor negligently destroys a 1994 Buick Regal worth $20,000. A
jury award of $20,000 compensates the former Buick owner by allowing
her to purchase a similar automobile and thus places her in a position
similar to her former one.95 A $20,000 jury award also deters potential
tortfeasors from destroying more automobiles by forcing actual tortfeasors
to pay victims an amount equivalent to what society, through the market,
pays for 1994 Buick Regals. 96
90. See Paul H. Rubin & John E. Calfee, Consequences of Damage Awards for
Hedonic and Other Nonpecunary Losses, 5 J. FORENSIC ECON. 249, 249 (1992) (observing
that economists measure hedonic losses as linear extrapolation from willingness to pay to
reduce risk).
91. See David R. Kamerschen & Robert W Kamerschen, Hedonic Damages in
Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Cases, 60 DEF COUNS. J. 118, 118 (1993) (identifying
compensation and deterrence as tort system's goals).
92. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 8.1(1), at 357 (analogizing compensation with
making good losses); Kamerschen & Kamerschen, supra note 91, at 118 (describing
objective of compensation as placing victims in "same position they would have occupied
had the injury never occurred").
93. See Kamerschen & Kamerschen, supra note 91, at 118 (defining objective of
deterrence as encouraging potential tortfeasors to use optimal care to avoid negligent
behavior); Rubin & Calfee, supra note 90, at 255 (explaining that deterrence justification
for damages exists in situations in which consumers prefer to pay costs of risk reduction,
but tortfeasor does not).
94. See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 89 (explaining that tort liability for property
functions effectively by providing adequate compensation and efficient levels of accident
deterrence).
95. See Calfee & Rubin, supra note 2, at 374 (indicating that compensation of $X will
restore victim who suffers $X reduction in wealth to original wealth).
96. See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 2 (stating that strict liability or negligence regime
1533
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1519 (1994)
Tort awards for nonpecumary losses, by contrast, rarely fulfill the
goals of compensation and deterrence simultaneously 9 First, most
nonpecumary losses lack adequate replacements, making compensation
impossible. 98 A $20,000 damage award allows the 1994 Buick Regal's
owner to replace her automobile; no amount of money replaces a life or
reverses the effects of paraplegia.99 Therefore, courts cannot make most
personal injury and wrongful death victims whole with damage awards.100
Second, nonpecumary losses often cause changes in the marginal utility
that individuals derive from wealth.101 Both personal injury victims and
survivors of wrongful death victims generally find money less useful than
they did before they suffered the loss."° Thus, the amount needed to
replace $20,000 worth of nonpecumary losses likely will be more than that
needed to replace $20,000 worth of pecuniary losses. The amount needed
to compensate victims for nonpecumary losses only rarely will equate with
the amount needed to deter potential tortfeasors from engaging in tortious
conduct.
will result m efficient levels of accident deterrence provided that regime appropriately
recognizes role of contributory negligence).
97 See Calfee & Rubin, supra note 2, at 372 (explaining that nonpecumary losses
eliminate approximate equivalence between willingness to pay for prevention and willingness
to pay for compensation).
98. See ViSCUSI, supra note 4, at 89 (noting "irreplaceable character of life and
health").
99. See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 2 (stating that no monetary transfer can restore
paraplegic to same well-being that paraplegic would have had if accident had not occurred);
see also Rubin & Calfee, supra note 90, at 254 (observing that "any level of compensation
for severe nonpecumary losses leaves consumers undercompensated").
100. See Foster v Trafalgar House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284, 286 (La. Ct. App.
1992) (noting that compensation for general damages never provides true compensation for
nonpecumary losses).
101. See W Kip Viscusi & William N. Evans, Utility Functions That Depend on Health
Status: Estimates and Economic Implications, 80 AM. ECON. REv 353, 371 (1990)
(concluding that healthy individuals generally enjoy greater marginal utility of income than
injured individuals do).
102. See Rubin & Calfee, supra note 90, at 251 (explaining that both victims of
personal injury and survivors of victims of wrongful death experience reduced marginal
utility of wealth). Economists Paul H. Rubin and John E. Calfee illustrate how death
reduces the marginal utility of survivors' wealth by using the example of the loss of a child's
life. Id. After a child's death, bereaved parents no longer need money to feed, clothe, and
educate their child. 1d. Instead of increasing the parents' need for wealth, the child's death
reduces the parents' need. Id. Parents would choose to have more money in a world in
which their child lives than in a world in which their child dies. Id.
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B. Methods of Arnving at Compensation and Deterrence Values
Economists assert that they can help policymakers define the
appropriate level of compensation for pamn and suffering"0 3 and the optimal
level at winch to deter conduct that causes death or injury 1o4 Economists
study the insurance market to determine the appropriate level of
compensation'0 5 and conduct WTP studies to determine the appropriate
level of deterrence."'6 Economists leave it to policymakers to decide
whether to award compensation values, deterrence values, or some
combination of the two in the context of nonpecumary damages.'0
1. Insurance Values
Economists view the tort system as an insurance market.108 Consum-
ers pay insurance premiums in the form of higher prices for goods and
services.1 9 In return, consumers receive compensation for harms that
those goods and services cause. 10 Courts serve as the conduit through
winch consumers make insurance claims.
In an efficient insurance market, rational consumers purchase
insurance to maximize expected utility between two worlds-a world in
103. See infra part IH.B.1 (discussing connection that economists draw between
compensation for pamn and suffering and insurance market).
104. See tfira part III.B.2 (discussing how economists define appropriate level at which
to deter conduct that causes death or injury).
105. Cf. Viscusi, supra note 18, at 5 (implying that social insurance efforts primarily
focus on appropriate compensation after accident). Cf. generally Calfee & Winston, supra
note 3 (conducting study of consumers' willingness to purchase insurance against
possibilities of nonpecumary losses for purpose of comparing optimal level of compensation
with optimal level of deterrence derived from WTP studies of consumers' purchasing
decisions).
106. Cf Viscusi, supra note 18, at 8 (observing that most estimates of deterrence values
come from wage-risk analyses).
107 See id. (stating that appropriate level of nonpecumary awards depends on whether
policymakers want damages to provide insurance or to create accident deterrence).
108. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 8.1(4), at 399 (stating that observers increasingly
view tort system as compulsory insurance); Calfee & Rubm, supra note 2, at 371 (stating
that tort system has features in common with insurance when used for compensation).
109. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 362 (stating that portion of purchase price for
products serves as insurance premium).
110. See id. (noting that firms use portion of purchase price to compensate consumers
for harms that products cause).
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which harm occurs and a world in which harm does not occur."1
Economists observe that consumers purchase insurance to compensate for
potential pecuniary harms.112  Interestingly, consumers rarely purchase
insurance to compensate for potential nonpecumary harms and buy very
little such insurance when they do. 13 Economists explain these phenomena
by pointing out that money provides a poor substitute for nonpecumary
harms. 114  Consumers thus prefer to have more money in the world in
which harm does not occur than in the world in which harm does occur.'15
Tort awards based on WTP studies, by exceeding the value consumers place
on insurance and forcing consumers to purchase more insurance (pay higher
prices) than they ideally would, create what economists characterize as a
deadweight loss for society 116
2. Deterrence Values
WTP studies measure the total amount of money that society believes
potential tortfeasors should spend for safety 117 Hedonic damages experts
111. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1539 (1987) (stating that insurance provides method for individuals to equalize
amount of money available to them over diverse states of world); Rubin & Calfee, supra note
90, at 251 (explaining that consumers rationally use insurance to maximize utility across vari-
ous states of world-one in which accident occurs and one in which accident does not occur).
112. See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 3 (observing that risk-averse individuals would choose
to insure fully against property losses).
113. See Priest, supra note 111, at 1547 (stating that one never observes individuals
purchasing insurance for pain and suffering); Rubin & Calfee, supra note 90, at 249 (stating
that consumers do not want insurance for nonpecumary losses). An individual who insures her
house for an amount in excess of what she would need to replace the house may be purchasing
insurance against nonpecumary losses that would accompany the destruction of her house.
114. See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 3 (noting that no mechanism exists to trade off health
losses for financial rewards).
115. See Calfee & Rubin, supra note 2, at 378-79 (explaining that optimally insured
consumer will pay more to prevent loss when loss reduces marginal utility); Rubin & Calfee,
supra note 90, at 249 (stating that "consumers are willing to pay large sums to prevent non-
pecuniary losses, but are not willing to pay similar sums for insurance against such losses").
116. See Calfee & Winston, supra note 3, at 154 (concluding that hedome damage awards
force consumers to purchase large insurance policies of far less value than their cost); Rubin
& Calfee, supra note 90, at 252-53 (concluding that prices must increase to cover involuntary
insurance premium that tort awards for nonpecuniary losses impose).
117 See Rubin & Calfee, supra note 90, at 255 (describing WTP measure of damages
as penalty needed to induce optimal precautions if potential injurer would otherwise take no




argue that courts encourage potential tortfeasors to spend a proper amount
on safety by permitting nonpecumary awards based on WTP studies."'
Some economists disagree, however, and note that hedonic damage awards
provide an optimal level of deterrence only if potential tortfeasors encounter
no other incentives to take safety precautions." 9 Adding hedonic damage
awards to other incentives encourages potential tortfeasors to behave in
ways that society considers less than optimal. 120
In the real world, many forces encourage potential tortfeasors to take
adequate safety precautions.' General Motors (GM), for example, faces
strict government safety regulation.1' Moreover, GM receives additional
safety incentives from consumers who rely on media-produced safety
information to decide which brand of automobile to purchase."z Even GM
shareholders exert influence on the safety calculus by selling shares of GM
stock following adverse reports about the safety of GM automobiles. 24 The
addition of hedomc damage awards in a context like'this in which safety
incentives already exist encourages GM to produce automobiles that society
considers "too safe."'12
C. Policy Analysis
When evaluating the relevance of hedonic damages calculations courts
generally have taken two approaches. Some courts have analyzed the issue
by addressing whether their respective jurisdictions award hedomc
118. C. BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 62 (Supp. 1992) (stating that value-of-
life estimates from WTP studies are "values of a statistically average American life based upon
what individuals are willing to pay to preserve a life"); Smith, supra note 9, at 48 (expressing
concern that hedonic damage awards might drive certain products from market).
119. See Rubin & Calfee, supra note 90, at 255 (concluding that presence of other
precautionary incentives makes WTP measure of damages larger than needed to induce optimal
precautions).
120. See id. at 256 (concluding that addition of tort-based incentives to other incentives
forces potential tortfeasors to take more precautions than society will pay for).
121. See id. at 258 (stating that no evidence indicating that risk-imposing behavior goes
undeterred exists).
122. Cf. id. at 255 (noting that National Highway Traffic Safety Administration directly
regulates automobile safety and that local governments often require automobile inspections).
123. C. id. at 257-58 (stating that consumers reduce demand for products alleged to be
or proven unsafe).
124. C. id. at 257 (citing studies that found relationships between safety recalls, product
tampering, and product liability actions on one hand and stock market prices on other).
125. Cf id. at 256 (explaining how deterrence incentives can encourage firms to act too
safely).
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damages. 1 6 Other courts have asked whether the testimony of hedomc
damages experts will assist jurors in assessing nonpecumary damages. 127
126. See, e.g., Livingston v United States, 817 F Supp. 601, 606 (E.D.N.C. 1993)
(concluding that North Carolina's wrongful death statute does not permit recovery of
hedonic damages); Johnson v Inland Steel Co., No. 87-C-5541, 1992 WL 396296, at *4
(N.D. IMI. Dec. 28, 1992) (stating that Indiana's wrongful death statute precludes recovery
of hedomc damages); Moore v Kroger Co., 800 F Supp. 429, 435-36 (N.D. Miss. 1992)
(concluding that Mississippi does not recognize claim for hedome damages separate from
physical pain and mental anguish m personal injury action, but declining to limit testimony
of expert until court could explore issue more fully at trial), at'd, 18 F.3d 936 (5th Cir.
1994); Mister v Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 790 F Supp. 1411, 1421 (S.D. Ill. 1992)
(concluding that allowing award of hedomc damages on top of back pay would cause double
recovery); Buckhalter v. Burlington N. R.R., No. EC90-139-D-D, 1992 WL 236676, at *1
(N.D. Miss. Mar. 23, 1992) (finding that Mississippi forbids recovery of damages for lost
enjoyment of life in wrongful death actions); Simmons v Hartford Ins. Co., 786 F Supp.
574, 579-81 (E.D. La. 1992) (concluding that Louisiana's survival and wrongful death
statutes do not permit recovery of hedonic damages); Ortega v Plexco, 793 F Supp. 298,
299 (D.N.M. 1991) (dismissing plaintiff's claim for hedonic damages in wrongful death
suit); Brown v Seebach, 763 F Supp. 574, 583 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (dismissing claim for
hedomc damages in cause of action under Florida's wrongful death statute); Frye v Town
of Akron, 759 F Supp. 1320, 1326 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (concluding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
permitted recovery of damages for decedent's lost enjoyment of life); Sterner v Wesley
College, Inc., 747 F Supp. 263, 272-74 (D. Del. 1990) (concluding that Delaware's
wrongful death and survival statutes do not permit recovery of hedonic damages); Sherrod
v. Berry, 629 F Supp. 159, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (stating that survivors of decedent could
recover fordecedent's lost enjoyment of life in § 1983 action), rev'd and remanded on other
grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988); Southlake Limousine & Coach, Inc. v Brock, 578
N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that Indiana's wrongful death statute does
not permit damages for decedent's lost pleasures of life); Spencer v A-1 Crane Serv., Inc.,
880 S.W.2d 938, 943-44 (Tenn. 1994) (concluding that Tennessee's wrongful death statute
does not permit recovery of hedonic damages).
127 See, e.g., Trabucco v Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 93-3090, 1994 WL 419846, at
*1 (E.D. La. Aug. 5, 1994) (concluding that jurors were capable of understanding propriety
of awarding general damages without help of expert); Mercado v Ahmed, 756 F Supp.
1097, 1103 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (concluding that testimony of hedonic damages expert would
not assist trier of fact), aft'd, 974 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1992); Sherrod v Berry, 629 F Supp.
159, 164 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (stating that testimony of hedonic damages expert enabled jury
to consider important aspect of injury to decedent's estate), rev'd and remanded on other
grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988); Fetzer v Wood, 569 N.E.2d 1237, 1246 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (agreeing with trial court's assertion that jury could decide damages for pain and
suffering as well as expert); Longman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 635 So. 2d 343, 354-55 (La. Ct.
App. 1994) (affirming trial court's finding that proffered testimony of hedonic damages
expert would not have aided jury); Foster v Trafalgar House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284,
286 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (describing task of awarding general damages as uniquely human
endeavor); cf. FED. R. EVID. 702 (requiring that expert testimony assist triers of fact).
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Neither approach addresses the critical issue-whether hedomc damage
awards acueve the goals that legislatures and courts have established for the
tort system.
1. Statutorily-Created Remedies
Courts have been extremely reluctant to award hedomc damages m
wrongful death and survival actions." In Sterner v Wesley College,
Inc.,i29 for example, the United States Distnct Court for the District of
Delaware considered whether parents of a student killed in a dormitory fire
could recover hedomc damages under Delaware's survival and wrongful
death statutes."3 The Sterner court noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had construed Pennsylvania's survival statute, the source of
Delaware's own survival statute, to preclude recovery of damages for life's
lost pleasures.r"i Consequently, the Sterner court concluded that the
plaintiffs could not recover for the hedomc value of the decedent's life
under Delaware's survival statute, but only for the pain and suffering the
decedent experienced between the start of the fire and his death."2
128. See, e.g., Livingston v. United States, 817 F Supp. 601, 604, 606 (E.D.N.C.
1993) (construing North Carolina's wrongful death statute to deny recovery of hedomc
damages); Johnson v. Inland Steel Co., No. 87-C-5541, 1992 WL 396296, at *3-4 (N.D.
I1. Dec. 28, 1992) (interpreting Indiana's wrongful death statute to deny recovery of
hedonic damages); Simmons v. Hartford Ins. Co., 786 F Supp. 574, 579-81 (E.D. La.
1992) (construing Louisiana's survival and wrongful death statutes to deny recovery of
hedonic damages); Brown v. Seebach, 763 F Supp. 574, 583 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (construing
Florida's wrongful death statute to deny recovery of hedonic damages); Frye v. Town of
Akron, 759 F Supp. 1320, 1327 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (construing Indiana's wrongful death
statute to deny recovery of hedonic damages); Sterner v. Wesley College, Inc., 747 F
Supp. 263, 272-74 (D. Del. 1990) (construing Delaware's wrongful death and survival
statutes to deny recovery of hedonic damages); Southlake Limousine & Coach, Inc. v.
Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 679-80 (nd. Ct. App. 1991) (construing Indiana's wrongful death
statute to deny recovery of hedonic damages); Spencer v A-1 Crane Serv., Inc., 880
S.W.2d 938, 943-44 (Tenn. 1994) (construing Tennessee's wrongful death statute to deny
recovery of hedonic damages). But see Kaufman v. Cserny, 856 F Supp. 1307, 1312
(S.D. Ill. 1994) (permitting recovery of hedonic damages under Illinois's survival act but
not under Illinois's wrongful death or family expense acts).
129. 747 F Supp. 263 (D. Del. 1990).
130. See Sterner v. Wesley College, Inc., 747 F Supp. 263, 272-74 (D. Del. 1990)
(discussing hedonic damages issue).
131. Id. at 272-73.
132. Id. at 273.
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The Sterner court also addressed the plaintiffs' contentions that they
could collect hedomc damages under Delaware's wrongful death statute,
either as a distinct basis of recovery or for the mental anguish that they, as
survivors, suffered following the decedent's death." The court observed
that the Delaware legislature specifically listed the types of damages
recoverable for wrongful death. 13 Because the Delaware Legislature failed
to list hedomc damages m the statute, the plaintiffs could not recover for
hedonic damages as a distinct basis of recovery 135 Similarly, the Sterner
court, stating that awards for mental anguish compensate survivors for the
grieving process but not for a decedent's lost pleasure, rejected the plaintiffs'
assertion that hedomc damages calculations measured survivors' mental
anguish. 36 As a result, the Sterner court refused to permit economist Stan
Smith to testify about his calculations of hedomc damages. 137 Strangely, the
Sterner court left open the possibility that Smith could use such evidence to
establish the decedent's pam and suffering. 
13
When state legislatures enact wrongful death and survival statutes, they
serve as policymakers in determining the proper level of damages in cases
m which victims have died.139 Wrongful death statutes m most jurisdictions
133. Id.
134. Id. at 274. Delaware's wrongful death statute permits recovery for deprivation
of the expectation of pecuniary benefits; loss of contributions for support; loss of parental,
marital, and household services; reasonable funeral expenses not to exceed $2000; and
mental anguish to the decedent's surviving spouse and next of kin. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 3724(d) (1975 & Supp. 1992).
135. Sterner, 747 F Supp. at 274.
136. Id., see also Southlake Limousine & Coach, Inc. v Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 678-
82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting argument similar to plaintiff's argument in Sterner).
In Southlake, the Third District Court of Appeals of Indiana reversed a $1.5 million
jury award in a civil action based on Indiana's wrongful death statute because of economist
Stan Smith's testimony on the value of hedonic damages. Id. at 682. Smith argued that his
calculations measured the value of the loss of care, love, and affection that the surviving
spouse sustained and the value of the loss of parental guidance that the children sustained
as a result of the death of Donna Brock. Id. at 678-79. The Southlake court, rejecting
Smith's assertion, concluded that Smith's calculations measured the value of Donna Brock's
life, not the value of the loss to Brock's husband and children. Id. at 682. The Southlake
court explained that Indiana's legislature did not intend for the state's wrongful death statute
to compensate victims for the decedent's loss, but rather for the loss sustained by survivors.
Id. at 679-80.
137 Sterner, 747 F Supp. at 275.
138. Id.
139. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 8.3 (discussing damages for wrongful death).
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severely restrict survivors' recoveries for a decedent's nonpecumary losses."
In such jurisdictions, state policymakers, by rejecting awards based on
deterrence values, have implicitly decided that hedomc damages calculations
that rely on WTP studies -irrelevant.'4 ' Courts should honor state policy-
makers' decisions, much as the Sterner court did, when courts interpret state
wrongful death and survival statutes. 42
In Sherrod v. Beny, 43 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois reached the opposite result of the Sterner court."4 In
Sherrod, the district court addressed whether it had properly admitted
economist Stan Smith's testimony on the hedomc value of human life m a
§ 1983 action 45 brought by the father of a man shot and killed by a police
officer.' 46 According to the court, § 1983 permitted the plaintiff to recover
damages for the loss of the decedent's life, including the decedent's lost
pleasures. 47 The Sherrod court concluded that Smith's presentation of data
from WTP studies enabled the jury to consider the value of the decedent's
lost pleasure from living. 14 Consequently, the Sherrod court held that it had
not erred in permitting Smith's expert testimony 149
140. See 2 id. § 8.3(1), at 429 (stating that most wrongful death statutes cover some
nonpecumary clauns of survivors).
141. See Tabacchi, supra note 88, at 348 (describing damage awards for lost enjoyment
of life in wrongful death actions as illogical, but noting that state legislatures likely will
consider whether to add hedonic damages to list of permitted damages in future); Gretchen
L. Valentine, Comment, Hedonic Damages: Emerging Issue in Personal Injury and Wrongful
Death Claims, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV 543, 577 (1990) (finding little justification for hedonic
damage awards in wrongful death actions).
142. See supra notes 129-38 and accompanying text (discussing Sterner). But see
generally Andrew J. McClurg, It's a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in
Wrongful Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV 57 (1990) (arguing that tort system should
award hedomc damages in wrongful death cases); Erin A. O'Hara, Note, Hedonic Damages
for Wrongful Death: Are Tortfeasors Getting Away with Murder?, 78 GEO. L.J. 1687 (1990)
(same). McClurg and O'Hara both ignore the existence of nontort-based incentives that
encourage potential tortfeasors to behave in ways that society considers optimal.
143. 629 F Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
144. See Sherrod v Berry, 629 F Supp. 159, 164 (N.D. Il. 1985) (permitting
economist Stan Smith to testify concerning hedonic damages), rev'd and remanded on other
grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
146. Sherrod, 629 F Supp. at 160.
147 Id. at 163.
148. Id. at 163-64.
149. Id. at 164.
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One arguably can justify the Sherrod court's decision to permit
Smith's testimony on the ground that Congress, m enacting § 1983, placed
a prenuum on deterring unconstitutional conduct by those, like the police
officer in Sherrod, acting under the mantle of governmental authority 150
Of course, police officers and others acting under the mantle of govern-
mental authority already encounter incentives to refrain from violating
individuals' constitutional rights,"' such as departmental disciplinary
proceedings,152 lawsuits for declaratory or mjunctive relief,5  and even
criminal sanctions. 5 Adding hedomc damage awards to these other
deterrence incentives may deter unconstitutional conduct more than
Congress intended. 55
2. Common-Law-Based Remedies
Courts assume roles as policyinakers when courts consider the proper
level of damages in areas, like personal injury, in which common-law
remedies still govern. 56 When evaluating the propriety of permitting
hedonic damage awards, courts first should ask what goals their respective
150. But see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978) (concluding that "[t]o the
extent that Congress intended that awards under § 1983 should deter the deprivation of
constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more
formidable than that inherent m the award of compensatory damages"). See generally John
A. Williamson, Note, Hedonic Damages in Section 1983 Actions: A Remedy for the
Unconstitutional Deprivation of Life, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv 321 (1987) (discussing
hedonic damages in context of § 1983 actions).
151. See generally Matthew V Hess, Comment, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the
Legal Remedies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV 149 (discussing legal remedies
for police misconduct).
152. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 366 (1976) (refusing to require Philadelphia
police department to upgrade procedures for handling police misconduct).
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (providing that individual whose constitutional rights
have been violated by person acting under color of state law can bring suit in equity). But
see City of Los Angeles v Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (denying plaintiffs' request to
enjoin Los Angeles police department from using life-threatening chokehold); Rizzo, 423
U.S. at 366 (reversing issuance of injunction that required Philadelphia to improve handling
of citizen complaints alleging police misconduct).
154. See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988) (crimmalizmg conspiracy to violate federal civil
rights); id. § 242 (crimmalizing deprivation of constitutional rights by persons acting under
color of law).
155. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text (discussing problem of multiple
deterrence incentives).
156. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 8.1 (discussing damages for personal injury).
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jurisdictions seek to achieve with tort awards-compensation through
awards approximating insurance values, deterrence, or some combination
of the two-recognzing, of course, that nonpecumary awards do not fulfill
the goals of compensation and deterrence simultaneously 15 Only
jurisdictions that emphasize deterring tortious conduct at the expense of
other goals should consider admitting testimony of hedomc damages
experts.
58
Courts also should evaluate whether society, through mechanisms
other than the tort system, already deters potential tortfeasors from
behaving in less-than-optimal ways. 9 Deterrence mechanisms may include
government regulations, 6° prices,' 61 and media-generated safety informa-
tion. 62  Finally, courts should consider possible side effects of hedomc
damage awards. Can society afford to pay hedomc damages? 63 Should
plaintiffs receive all or most of such awards?'" In what situations, if any,
157 See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (explaining why tort awards for
nonpecumary losses do not achieve goals of compensation and deterrence simultaneously).
158. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining that WTP studies measure
deterrence values).
159. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text (explaining importance of
considering nontort-based deterrents).
160. See Rubin & Calfee, supra note 90, at 255 (identifying sources of direct govern-
mental regulation of products and professionals).
161. See id. at 254-55 (explaining how prices signal risk). Rubin and Calfee assert that
society would not need to use the tort system to deter potential tortfeasors if individuals had
perfect information about risks. Id. at 255. Rubin and Calfee explain that the results of
wage-risk analyses lend support to this assertion. Id. at 256. Workers distinguish between
the riskiness of various jobs and demand more money for riskier jobs. Id. The extra
compensation that employers pay workers encourages employers to spend optimally on
safety. Id.
162. See id. at 257 (discussing link between reputation and optimal deterrence). The
news media aid the tort system m deterring potential tortfeasors by communicating the
progress and results of tort actions. Id. at 255.
163. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing estimates of societal cost
of hedonic damage awards); see also Smith, supra note 9, at 48 (comparing cost of hedonic
damage awards to present value (1990) of savings and loan bailout).
164. See Smith, supra note 9, at 48 (calling issue of whether estate should receive
award for decedent's loss of life legitimate one for public debate).
Professor George L. Priest expresses concern that pain and suffering awards have
regressive income distribution effects, particularly in the product liability context. Priest,
supra note 111, at 1558. Priest explains that all consumers pay the same third-party
insurance premium when they purchase goods and services. Id. at 1559. Yet, courts award
high-income individuals more money than they award low-income individuals. Id. The rich
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should courts award punitive damages as an additional deterrence
incentive?" Scholarly discussion about the potential wrinkles of hedomc
damage awards has just begun.
D Assistance to Triers of Fact
WTP studies measure the behavior and opinions of average individuals
presumably just like jurors." As a result, some courts have found hedomc
damages calculations based on WTP studies problematic. 67 In Fetzer v
Wood,6 ' the Second District Appellate Court of Illinois addressed tius
get richer as a result, and the poor get poorer. Id. Hedonic damage awards potentially
exacerbate the regressive income distribution problem.
In addition, hedomc damage awards based on WTP studies provide financial windfalls
to some plaintiffs, particularly survivors of wrongful death victims, much as large punitive
damage awards do. Recognizing this problem, several states have limited the portion of
punitive damage awards that plaintiffs can keep for themselves. See, e.g., IOWA CODE
ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1987) (limiting plaintiff to only 25% of punitive damage award m
cases m which defendant did not aim conduct specifically at plaintiff); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3402 (Supp. 1993) (providing that plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases keep only
50% of punitive damage awards); N.Y. Civ PRAc. L. & R. § 8701 (McKinney Supp. 1994)
(giving plaintiffs only 75% of punitive damage awards). Policymakers could decide to limit
hedomc damage awards accordingly. Ideally, any amount of a pam and suffering award m
excess of what the plaintiffs needed for compensation would go to reducing future risks of
death and injury
165. See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 14-15 (arguing that courts should use WTP concepts
to set punitive damage awards).
W Kip Viscusi argues that courts currently lack clear guidelines for setting punitive
damage awards. Id. at 15. Viscusi believes that WTP studies provide policymakers with
a solution to this problem in product liability actions. Id. According to Viscusi, courts
should award punitive damages against manufacturers who exhibit considerable disregard
for safety incentives. Id. Any manufacturer who spends only $10,000 to save one life when
society would spend much more, for example, should pay punitive damages.
It makes little sense to award both hedonic damages and punitive damages based on
data from WTP studies. Hedonic damage awards deter potential tortfeasors from behaving
m ways that society considers less than optimal. Courts should award punitive damages on
top of hedomc damages only when courts intend to punish (in.some truly retributive sense)
tortfeasors and to ignore economic theory
166. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (stating that wage-risk and consumer
market analyses measure actual behavior); supra note 43 and accompanying text (indicating
that contingent valuation surveys measure opinions).
167 See Mercado v Ahmed, 756 F Supp. 1097, 1103 (N.D.'Ill. 1991) (comparing
admission of evidence based on WTP studies with permitting jurors to ask group of court
bystanders their opinions), aft'd, 974 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1992).
168. 569 N.E.2d 1237 (Il. App. Ct. 1991).
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problem when the court considered whether a state trial court had erred m
excluding the testimony of hedonic damages expert Stan Smith in a
wrongful death action. 69 In Fetzer, the court noted that Illinois law
requires that expert testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. "70 The court observed that the
plaintiffs had conceded that jurors understand the concept of value of life
in a general sense, indicating that jurors did not find it difficult to
comprehend the subject matter of WTP studies. 7' Accordingly, the Fetzer
court concluded that Smith's proposed testimony would not aid jurors in
their deliberations.17
While the Fetzer court's argument has some superficial appeal, it
ignores two important considerations. First, the mere fact that average
individuals provide data for WTP studies does not mean that average jurors
could derive a statistical life value from WTP data without expert assis-
tance. '7 Second, average jurors probably lack the skills needed to calculate
the appropriate amount of a nonpecunlary award based solely on their
opimons about what they would spend to reduce their respective risks of
death. 74 Courts theoretically could develop detailed jury instructions
describing ways for jurors to conduct their own calculations, but likely
would find doing so a formidable task.
IV Reliability of Hedomc Damages Calculations
Not surprisingly, economists who conduct WTP studies and reviewers
of the WTP literature generally agree that WTP studies accurately measure
what society will expend to save a statistical life. 75 Hedonic damages
169. Fetzer v Wood, 569 N.E.2d 1237, 1244, 1247 (I11. App. Ct. 1991).
170. Id. at 1247; see FED. R. EvID. 702 (requiring that expert assist trier of fact to
understand evidence or determine fact in issue).
171. Fetzer, 569 N.E.2d at 1247
172. Id.
173. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (identifying formula economists use to
measure value of statistical life). One need only read a WTP study or review of WTP
literature to recognize the complexity of undertaking a value-of-life analysis.
174. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (identifying formula experts use to derive
hedonic damages from WTP studies). One must remember that hedonic damages experts
not only estimate the amount of lost earnings, fringe benefits, household services, and
financial security, but also adjust all of these estimates to reflect the victim's pre-injury life
expectancy and present values. BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 168.
175. See, e.g., JONEs-LEE, supra note 56, at 36 (calling WTP approach most effective
means currently available for taking account of variations in safety in public decisions);
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experts also agree that WTP studies offer the best source of information for
calculating nonpecumary damages. 76 Critics of WTP studies and hedomc
damages attack both propositions."7 Although many courts have questioned
the reliability of WTP studies and hedomc damages experts' calculations,
they have found it difficult to sort through the morass of conflicting
claims. 17
8
A. Reliability of Willingness-to-Pay Studies
Critics raise three major objections to WTP studies that deserve
extended consideration. First, critics assert that WTP studies measure only
small risks and that this limitation makes value-of-life data unhelpful m
many contexts. 79 Second, critics challenge much of the risk assessment
information upon which economists conducting WTP studies depend for
their calculations."8 Third, critics question whether courts truly can rely
Viscusi, supra note 45, at 73 (stating that WTP approach became well established in
1970s); Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 88 (observing that current consensus in economics
profession is that determining what people will pay provides appropriate way to measure
value of reducing risk of death); Miller, supra note 13, at 879 (claimig that "use of risk
reduction values to value lives has become widely accepted").
176. See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 161 (describing hedonic damages
model as "grounded on well-accepted economic principles").
177 See generally James Lambrinos, Hedonic Damages: Economic Theory, Statistical
Foundation, Strategy, 58 DEFENSE COUNS. J. 391 (1991) (discussing theoretical and
empirical criticisms of WTP methodology); Jerome M. Staller, Testimony from Oz:
'Hedomc' Damages in Personal Injury, FOR DEF., Aug. 1990, at 30 (arguing that hedonic
damages do not measure value of life's lost pleasure); Staller, supra note 28 (same).
178. See, e.g., Livingston v United States, 817 F Supp. 601, 606 (E.D.N.C. 1993)
(expressing concern that WTP measures do not work when certainty of death exists);
Mercado v. Ahmed, 756 F Supp. 1097, 1103 (N.D. 111. 1991) (concluding that economists'
life valuations lack reliability), aft'd, 974 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1992); Sherrod v Berry, 629
F Supp. 159, 164 (N.D. Il. 1985) (concluding that hedonic damages expert's testimony
helped jurors arrive at proper measure of damages), rev'd and remanded on other grounds,
856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988); Fetzer v. Wood, 569 N.E.2d 1237, 1247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(declaring damages for loss of enjoyment of life not amenable to analytical precision); Foster
v Trafalgar House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284, 286 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that
intellectual and emotional losses do not lend themselves to mathematical computation and
analysis); Wilt v Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 204 (W Va. 1993) (questioning reliability
of WTP studies).
179. See mfra part IV.A.1 (discussing criticism that WTP studies measure only small
changes m risk).




on the vast range of value-of-life estimates that WTP studies present.' 8 1
None of these objections necessarily requires courts to reject WTP studies
out of hand as "junk science."
1. Small Risks v Large Risks
The value that society identifies as the optimal level of deterrence
varies with the degree of risk." Just because individuals will pay $10 to
purchase a safety device that reduces their respective risks of death by one
m sixty thousand does not mean that they will pay $100,000 to reduce their
risks by one in six in a game of Russian roulette."n Most individuals can
pay $10 for a safety device; not everyone can pay $100,000.1' Converse-
ly, individuals will not expose themselves to some safety risks for any
amount of money's because risks eventually become so large that
individuals fear that they will not reap the benefits of their risk-takng.' 86
WTP studies measure only relatively small changes m risk.1s7
Because no linear relationship exists between individuals' willingness to pay
or to accept money to avoid small risks and their willingness to pay or to
accept money to avoid very large risks, data from WTP studies prove
unhelpful in the latter context.s Like WTP studies, though, the tort
181. See infra part IV.A.3 (discussing criticism of range of value-of-life estimates).
182. See Rubm & Calfee, supra note 90, at 254 (stating that willingness to pay for
marginal reduction m risk will be greater than willingness to pay to eliminate risk altogether
for large losses).
183. See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 10 (illustrating that individuals' attitudes toward
large risks differ from their attitudes toward small risks); supra note 31 and accompanying
text (discussing WTP analysis of game of Russian roulette).
184. See Rubin & Calfee, supra note 90, at 254 (describing limitation of "income
effect" on WTP studies).
185. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 199 (stating that simply because individual demands
$100 to incur .0001 risk of death does not mean that he will demand $100,000 to recur .1
risk of death); see also Livingston v. United States, 817 F Supp. 601, 606 (E.D.N.C. 1993)
(observing that inducements necessary to persuade person to perform dangerous activity
increase as certainty of death increases until person needs infinite inducement to engage in
activity involving certain death).
186. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 199-200 (explaining that exposure to greater risk
makes it less likely that risk taker will enjoy monetary differential for taking risk).
187 See Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 89 (observing that WTP studies look at small
reductions in risk); Viscusi, supra note 18, at 10 (noting that deterrence values m WTP
studies pertain to small changes in risk).
188. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 199-200 (observing nonlinear relationship between
risk and utility).
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system traditionally concerns itself with making tortfeasors pay damages to
victims for creating relatively small risks."8 9 Courts hold a manufacturer
liable for a drug that kills one in every five thousand users and hold a
negligent driver liable for an automible accident although that driver has
driven thousands of miles safely 19 Only in the area of intentional torts, in
which awards in excess of hedomc damages arguably may be appropriate,
do risk levels greatly exceed the risks that WTP studies observe. 9'
Consequently, the fact that WTP studies measure small risks does not make
them unhelpful."
2. Risk Assessment
Critics question much of the risk assessment information upon which
WTP studies rely 11 Most WTP studies use risk data collected for other
purposes to calculate the value of a statistical life."9 Wage-risk analyses,
for example, generally rely on job safety data that the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) gathers from a nonscientific sample of employers."9 Critics
assail BLS data for relying on employers' reports about job-related deaths
and injunes'96 and for failing to differentiate between jobs within particular
occupations and for thus equating the job-related risks of individuals as
diverse as the assembly line worker and the secretary working in the same
factory '97
189. See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 10 (discussing connection between individual
valuations of small changes m risk and tort liability).
190. See d. (noting low probability of death from use of most products); see also Rubin
& Calfee, supra note 90, at 253 (discussing tort liability for schizophrenia drug Chlozaril-
treatment with .0002 probability of fatal side effects).
191. Cf. POSNER, supra note 11, at 209 (arguing that courts should award punitive
damages m "real" intentional tort cases, but not in strict liability and negligence cases).
192. See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 10 (arguing that fact that WTP studies measure
small risks should not undermine their usefulness m tort liability context).
193. See Lambrmos, supra note 177, at 394-95 (questioning risk estimates upon which
wage-risk analyses rely).
194. Cf. Dardis, supra note 38, at 1079 (relying on risk information from National
Bureau of Standards).
195. See Miller, supra note 34, at 20 (calling Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) risk data
most frequently used m wage-risk analyses and noting that BLS relies on nonstatistically-
designed sample).
196. See id. (describing failure to differentiate risks for janitor, clerk, factory
production worker, and supervisor within particular industry as problem with BLS data).
197 See itd. (questioning whether company reports to BLS miss some deaths and omit
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In addition, critics argue that individuals inaccurately perceive
differences between risks, especially small risks like those that WTP studies
address.' Ideally, economists conducting WTP studies would rely on
individuals' risk perceptions in their calculations because individuals decide
how much to spend to reduce safety risks based on their perceptions, not
on reality 199 The cost and complexity of gathering information about
individuals' risk perceptions, though, appears to have discouraged
economists from conducting such research. Empirical research does
indicate that individuals perceive risks to their safety reasonably accurately,
although less than perfectly 1oo
Finally, critics assert that economists who conduct WTP studies
generally ignore nonrisk-based explanations for behavior."1 Wage-risk
analyses, for example, generally assume that workers move freely among
different occupations and change occupations solely because of risk-based
concerns. 3 In reality, workers may accept jobs as coal miners to be close
some injuries).
198. See Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 92 (noting concern that workers lack awareness
about on-the-job risks); Lambrinos, supra note 177, at 393 (questioning whether workers
know about health risks associated with different jobs); Miller, supra note 34, at 17
(identifying accuracy of people's perceptions of risk across situations as potential source of
systematic bias in WTP studies).
199. See Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 92 (citing wage-risk analysis by Douglas
Gegax, Shelby Gerking, and William Schulze as improvement over previous WTP studies
because Gegax, Gerking, and Schulze relied on workers' own perceptions of job risk);
Miller, supra note 34, at 17 (identifying difference between perceived and actual risk as
potential source of systematic bias in WTP studies).
200. See VISCUSI, supra note 45, at 110 (observing consistency between Bayesian
(rational) model of risk-taking behavior and actual behavior, but noting that not all behavior
coincides with model); see also W Kip Viscusi & Charles J. O'Connor, Adaptive Responses
to Chenucal Labeling: Are Workers Bayestan Decision Makers?, 74 AM. ECON. REv 942,
955-56 (1984) (concluding that survey of chemical workers' risk perceptions reveals that
market operates reasonably effectively at conveying risk information); Fisher et al., supra
note 16, at 89-90 (characterizing workers' perceptions in Viscusi & O'Connor's study as
quite similar to objective measures of on-the-job risk); Lambrinos, supra note 177, at 393
(same).
201. See Lambrmos, supra note 177, at 393-94, 395-96 (expressing concern that
omitted variables might explain wage-risk differentials).
202. See Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 90 (stating that wage-risk studies assume that
workers move freely between jobs); Lambrinos, supra note 177, at 393-94 (questioning
assumption that workers enter and exit jobs freely).
203. See Lambrinos, supra note 177, at 395-96 (identifying other possible explanations
for wage-risk differentials).
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to their families, or may decline coal mining jobs because they do not like
to get dirty 204
Critics of the risk assessment information upon which WTP studies
rely certainly raise issues worthy of future study Even if well-founded,
however, these criticisms do not require a wholesale rejection of large
numbers of WTP studies. Reviewers of the WTP literature already take
into account criticisms of particular studies and either adjust study results
consistently with valid criticisms or, when necessary, reject study data
outright.2 5  Future WTP research will address many of the issues that
critics currently raise,2' 6 and future reviewers likely will continue to
recalculate the results of particular WTP studies as risk assessment
improves.
3. Discrepancies in Value-of-Life Estimates
Despite efforts by reviewers such as Fisher et al.,2"7 Miller,20 and
Viscusi °9 to reconcile data from various WTP studies, significant
discrepancies among value-of-life estimates remain.210 Reviewers offer
two explanations for these discrepancies. First, individuals do not always
behave consistently 211 Individuals will expend more resources to save a
specific life, such as that of "Baby Jessica" McClure, than they will to
save an anonymous life.212 Individuals also exhibit a greater willingness
204. See id. at 395 (identifying skills, unionization, and pleasant work environment as
variables affecting wages).
205. See VIscusi, supra note 45, at 34-74 (evaluating specific WTP studies); Fisher et
al., supra note 16, at 88-98 (same); Miller, supra note 34, at 17-39 (same).
206. Cf. generally Michael J. Moore & W Kip Viscusi, Doubling the Estimated Value
of Life: Results Using New Occupational Fatality Data, 7 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 476
(1988) (comparing data on occupational fatalities that National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health compiles with BLS data for purpose of identifying best measure of actual
job-related risk).
207 Fisher et al., supra note 16.
208. Miller, supra note 34.
209. Viscusi, supra note 45, at 34-74.
210. See id. at 73 (finding $4 million range m reasonable value-of-life estimates); Fisher
et al., supra note 16, at 96 (finding $6.9 million range in value-of-life estimates among most
defensible empirical studies); Miller, supra note 34, at 33 (including margin of error of plus
or mmus 30% m estimate of value of statistical life).
211. See Miller, supra note 13, at 899 (noting lack of consistency in people's behavior
toward risk).
212. See Viscusi, supra note 45, at 21 (stating that society places greater value on
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to avert fatalities when they have not chosen to expose themselves to the
risk.21 3 Second, individuals differ widely in their willingness to expose
themselves to risky behavior.214 WTP studies of police officers, for
example, derive lower value-of-life estimates than studies of other
segments of the population do.215
As long as hedonic damages experts rely on WTP studies as sources
for the mean value of a statistical life, discrepancies among WTP studies
should raise few concerns. 216 After all, hedomc damage awards seek to
deter potential tortfeasors from acting in ways that average individuals
consider optimal, not to compensate victims.2"7 Only when experts rely
on WTP studies of atypical groups or attempt to tailor their estimates to
characteristics of particular victims does the wide range of estimates
become problematic. Reviews of the WTP literature traditionally dismiss
studies of potentially atypical groups, such as police officers, when
deriving consensus value-of-life estimates.
21 8
saving specific lives than on saving anonymous lives); Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 97
(explaining that individuals will expend more resources to save specific individual in life-
threatening situation that to save anonymous individual because of empathy); see also
BRooKsHnm & SMrrH, supra note 13, at 170 (discussing possibility of calculating hedonic
damages by using data on society's willingness to pay for specific lives at risk).
"Baby Jessica" McClure was a 18 month-old child who tumbled into and became
trapped in a well in her parents' backyard in Midland, Texas in 1987 Baby Jessica's
rescue from the well received extensive media coverage. Lee Hancock, Rescung Jessica:
Five Years Later, CHI. TaB., Oct. 14, 1991, at 8.
213. See Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 97 (observing that society's valuations of risk
depend on way of dying). People exhibit much less willingness to accept risks over which
they have no control, such as the risk of injury or death as a result of a nuclear accident
or from air pollution, than risks that they voluntarily undertake, such as the risk of dying
as a result of an automobile accident. Id.
214. See Miller, supra note 13, at 899-900 (discussing differences in individuals' risk
averseness).
215. See generally Stuart A. Low & Lee R. McPheters, Wage Differentials and Risk
of Death: An Empirical Analysis, 21 ECON. INQUIRY 271 (1983) (concluding that police
officers place value of $870,000 on statistical life).
216. See Miller, supra note 13, at 899 (explaining that hedonic damages expert using
individualized approach should address behavioral inconsistencies).
217 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (defining purpose of hedomc damage
awards).
218. See Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 93 (rejecting values derived from Low and
McPheters' study of police officers); Miller, supra note 34, at 24 (same).
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4. Policy Analysis
Discrepancies in value-of-life estimates in the WTP literature have
troubled courts.219 In Mercado v Ahmed,"2 ° for example, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois raised the discrep-
ancies among WTP data as an issue when considering whether to admit
testimony by hedomc damages expert Stan Smith in a personal injury
action." 1 In Mercado, the court observed that Federal Rule of Evidence
702 limits expert testimony to areas of "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge."Im The court found no agreement among econ-
onists about the elements that go into life valuations or about which WTP
studies courts should consider.' The Mercado court, in rejecting Smith's
testimony, noted that coincidence could explain any similarities between
studies with bottom lines ranging from $100,000 to $12 million.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
affirming the district court's decision, also expressed serious doubt that
WTP studies measure the degree to which Americans value life.' The
Seventh Circuit stated that advertising and marketing, in addition to
degrees of risk, affect spending decisions on items such as smoke
detectors. 26 The Seventh Circuit also worried that individuals' abilities
to pay for items such as smoke detectors might skew results. 7 Although
admitting that Smith's proposed testimony might have some merit, the
Seventh Circuit declined to conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to admit Smith's testimony 1
219. See Mercado v Ahmed, 756 F Supp. 1097, 1103 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (expressing
concern about breadth of estimates in WTP studies that value life at less than $100,000 to
over $12 million), aff'd, 974 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1992); Fetzer v Wood, 569 N.E.2d 1237,
1246-47 (1. App. Ct. 1991) (expressing concern that WTP studies valuing life at between
$1.6 million and $8.5 million lack analytical precision).
220. 756 F Supp. 1097 (N.D. Il. 1991).
221. Mercado v. Ahmed, 756 F Supp. 1097, 1102-03 (N.D. l. 1991), af4'd, 974 F.2d
863 (7th Cir. 1992).
222. Id. at 1101.
223. Id. at 1103.
224. Id.
225. Mercado v Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 871 (7th Cir. 1992).
226. Id.





Courts considering whether to admit the testimony of hedomc
damages experts should not attach much significance to the Mercado
court's observation that any snilarities m WTP studies' results could arise
solely from comcidence. 9  WTP studies do measure the value that
average individuals place on reducing small risks, 0 and scientific
evidence indicates that individuals act reasonably consistently, although not
perfectly consistently, when they confront similar risks." Nevertheless,
the Seventh Circuit's concern that WTP studies fail to control for variables
other than risk that affect behavior certainly raises a difficult issue. 2 One
must remember, however, that no WTP study can control for every
possible variable and that reviewers of the WTP literature disregard WTP
studies when factors other than risk obviously played a significant role in
the research subjects' responses. 23s
The Seventh Circuit's concern that differences among individuals'
abilities to pay rmght skew the results of WTP studies" 4 misses the mark.
The real world places limits on individuals' abilities to pay to reduce risks.
In fact, WTP studies would derive infinite estimates for the value of a
statistical life if WTP studies did not take ability-to-pay limitations into
consideration." Besides, ability-to-pay limitations work to the detriment
of plaintiffs seeking to introduce hedomc damages experts' testimony
B. Reliability of Experts' Calculations
Critics of hedonic damage awards characterize experts' calculations
as both speculative 6 and duplicative of other portions of traditional
229. Mercado v Ahmed, 756 F Supp. 1097, 1103 (N.D. Il. 1991), aff'd, 974 F.2d
863 (7th Cir. 1992).
230. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing what WTP studies measure).
231. See supra part IV.A.3 (discussing discrepancies across WTP studies).
232. See Mercado v Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 871 (7th Cir. 1992).
233. Compare Fisher et al., supra note 16, at 96 (disregarding Ippolito and Ippolito's
study of cigarette market because of unique habit-forming nature of cigarettes) with Miller,
supra note 34, at 27 tbl.3 (relying upon Ippolito and Ippolito's study of cigarette market).
234. Mercado, 974 F.2d at 871.
235. Cf. Calfee & Winston, supra note 3, at 142-43 n.17 (noting that contingent
valuation surveys receive criticism for failing to place budget constraints on individuals'
behavior).
236. See Staller, supra note 177, at 30 (calling calculation of hedonic damages
impossible task and testimony of hedonic damages experts fraud on court).
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damage awards ." As evidence of the speculative nature of hedomc
damage awards, critics note that experts do not tailor their calculations to
reflect victims' personal characteristics." Additionally, critics point to the
medical component of tort awards as a possible source of duplicative
recoveries. 9  Paraplegics, for example, often receive compensation for
new wheelchair ramps, reconstructed bathrooms, and widened doorways as
medical expenses.2' To avoid duplicative awards in personal mjury
actions, mental health professionals providing percentage-of-loss estimates
must carefully consider the extent of the victim's loss after tort compensa-
tion for medical expenses."4  Interestingly, courts repeatedly have
addressed the potentially speculative nature of hedomc damage awards, but
not the possibility of duplicative awards.242
Individuals will pay different amounts to avoid risks. 3 Yet, hedomc
damages experts treat all people of the same age as if they valued avoiding
risks equally 4 In Sherrod,.5 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois rejected the argument that an expert's failure
to differentiate among victims made the expert's calculations speculative.' 6
237 See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 4 (expressing concern about possibility of double
recoveries).
238. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing fact that hedome damages
experts do not adjust value-of-life estimates to reflect victims' personal characteristics).
239. See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 4 (noting that medical expense awards subsume
many expenditures related to well-being).
240. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 8.1(3) (identifying types of damages recoverable
under heading of medical expense).
241. See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 4 (explaining that juries need not compensate
victims for items included in medical component of tort recovery as part of pam and
suffering award); supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text (discussing hedonic damages
calculations in personal injury actions).
242. Compare Sherrod v Berry, 629 F Supp. 159, 164 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (rejecting
argument that hedonic damages are speculative), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 856
F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988) with Trabucco v Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 93-3090, 1994 WL
419846, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 5, 1994) (characterizing report of hedonic damages expert
as speculative) and Foster v Trafalgar House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284, 286 (La. Ct.
App. 1992) (concluding that hedomc damages are speculative).
243. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (stating that individuals differ widely
in willingness to expose themselves toa risky behavior).
244. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (stating that hedonic damages experts
do not adjust estimates to reflect victims' personal characteristics).
245. For further discussion of Sherrod, see supra notes 143-55 and accompanying text.
246. Sherrod, 629 F Supp. at 164.
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The Sherrod court stated that the rule against awards for speculative
damages applies only if the cause of damages, not the measure or extent of
damages, is speculative.247 Because no one doubted that the victim in
Sherrod suffered a nonpecumary loss-death-the court concluded that the
expert's testimony did not violate the rule against speculative awards.'
Critics' arguments about the speculative nature of hedomc damage
awards ignore the purpose behind such awards. When awarding hedomc
damages, courts do not compensate particular victims, but rather deter
conduct that society does not consider optimal.249 Hedomc damage awards
parallel punitive damage awards in this respect because both focus on the
tortfeasor's conduct, not on the victim's loss.'O The failure to take
particular victims' unique characteristics into account arises because of the
nature of hedomc damage awards, not because of any weakness in experts'
methods of calculation.
V Conclusion
Hedonic damages experts have challenged courts to look seriously at
the appropriate level of damages for nonpecumary losses. Although courts
have risen to this challenge, much of their analysis reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of the purpose of WTP studies and hedomc damages
calculations. Those who conduct WTP studies do so to determine the
appropriate expenditure for prevention of physical injury or death, not the
appropriate level of compensation after physical injury or death has
occurred."1 Courts should award hedonic damages only in cases m which
the tort system emphasizes the goal of deterrence exclusively and only if
society does not provide potential tortfeasors with significant nontort-based
deterrence incentives.
Future WTP studies likely will address many of the reliability issues
that critics raise.' z As a result, rationales that courts currently offer to
247 Id.
248. Id.
249. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of hedonic damage
awards).
250. See Viscusi, supra note 18, at 14-15 (identifying establishment of effective safety
incentives as goal of punitive damage awards).
251. See supra part III (discussing relevance of hedonic damages calculations to pain
and suffering awards).
252. See supra part IV (discussing reliability of WTP studies and hedonic damages
calculations).
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justify rejecting the testimony of hedomc damages experts will become
Inapplicable, or at least vulnerable to relitigation m the future. Courts that
reject expert testimony solely on reliability grounds likely will revisit the
reliability issue more than once m the coming decades.
The debate over the use of WTP studies to calculate hedomc damages
also raises questions about the role that the tort system should play m
today's increasingly regulated society The tort system provides only one
means of deterring what society defines as inappropriate behavior. Because
of the tort system's notorious inefficiencies, 3 policymakers likely will
choose to limit the tort system's deterrent role in certain contexts in the
future. As a result, the packages of remedies that courts make available for
such torts as product liability, medical malpractice, and automobile injury
may very well differ from one another in the future, making hedomc
damages calculations relevant in some contexts but not in others.
Dennis C. Taylor
253. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 8
CARDOZO L. REv 1139 (1987) (addressing inefficiencies of tort system m areas of medical
malpractice and product liability for drug manufacturers); Priest, supra note III (addressing
inefficiencies of tort system as insurer).
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